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MYRIAD IN VIEW OF THE PREEXISTING PRODUCTS DOCTRINE: 
ADOPTING A STRUCTURAL APPROACH 
INTRODUCTION 
Modern advances in biotechnology have created analytical tension in the 
patent system, stretching the boundaries of the notion of patentability.1 The 
conditions precedent to an invention’s patentability can generally be 
categorized by four terms of the Patent Act of 1952: subject matter eligibility,2 
utility,3 novelty,4 and nonobviousness.5 Due to the lack of statutory specificity 
relating to the definition of subject matter eligibility, uncertainty has developed 
about the patent eligibility of would-be inventions.6 Contributing to this 
uncertainty, courts have recently attempted to use 35 U.S.C. § 101 as a 
mechanism for limiting the scope of available business method protection.7 
The murkiness of this statutory element has resulted in a conflation of its 
requirements with the issues of utility, novelty, and nonobviousness.8 The 
 
 1. See Stephen H. Schilling, Note, DNA as Patentable Subject Matter and a Narrow 
Framework for Addressing the Perceived Problems Caused by Gene Patents, 61 DUKE L.J. 731, 
732–33 (2011). 
 2. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, 
may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”); see also 
Efthimios Parasidis, A Uniform Framework for Patent Eligibility, 85 TUL. L. REV. 323, 326 
(2010) (“A judicious analysis of patent jurisprudence reveals a two-step method for determining 
patent-eligible subject matter: an invention is patent-eligible if (1) it corresponds to a statutory 
category outlined in section 101 of the Patent Act, which includes processes, machines, 
manufactures, or compositions of matter, and (2) does not violate the product of nature doctrine, 
which precludes eligibility for laws of nature, natural phenomenon, mental processes, and abstract 
ideas.” (footnote omitted)). 
 3. See Michael Risch, A Surprisingly Useful Requirement, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 57, 58 
(2011) (“[T]he requirement that an invention be useful has been nearly nonexistent—essentially 
ignored. The level of ‘utility’ an applicant must currently demonstrate to obtain a patent is 
extremely low: the invention need only operate as described and potentially provide some de 
minimis public benefit.” (footnote omitted)). 
 4. See 35 U.S.C. § 102. 
 5. See id. § 103. 
 6. See Parasidis, supra note 1, at 326. 
 7. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). 
 8. See Patentable Subject Matter and the Supreme Court Myriad Preview, PATENTLY-O 
BLOG (Aug. 3, 2011, 7:24 AM), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2011/08/patentable-subject-
matter.html. 
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effects of this confusion on modern scientific progress can be seen in 
Association for Molecular Pathology v. United States Patent and Trademark 
Office (Myriad I) and its subsequent procedural history.9 
Much has been said about the Myriad litigation, but confusion still exists. 
In 2009, a group of plaintiffs represented by the American Civil Liberties 
Union filed suit in federal court challenging the validity of patents held by 
Myriad Genetics over sequences of isolated DNA and cDNA and the methods 
of creating those same genetic compositions.10 Myriad I was decided once at 
trial, affirmed in part and reversed in part on appeal by the Federal Circuit, 
vacated on certiorari, and again affirmed in part and reversed in part by the 
Federal Circuit for the same reasons as the initial Federal Circuit opinion.11 In 
both Federal Circuit decisions, each judge on the three-member panel diverged 
as to the reason for his or her opinion. Additionally, the district court judge 
based his opinion on an entirely different rationale than any of the three 
Federal Circuit judges. The difference of opinion among the four judges 
underscores the confusion in patentability cases, particularly as applied in the 
biotechnology field. Each of the judges purported to base his or her conclusion 
on § 101, and each of the judges cited cases that consider the import of 
nineteenth-century Supreme Court precedent that articulates a rule for the 
patentability of purifications of preexisting products. This Note tracks the 
development of the purification doctrine, discusses its application to the 
Myriad litigation, and proposes an analytical approach to the doctrine that 
would create more predictable and consistent results in patentability cases. 
The purified preexisting products doctrine was established by the Supreme 
Court in the nineteenth century.12 At that time, the basic articulation of the 
doctrine could be conveyed as follows: a mere extraction of a pure 
composition from impure surroundings does not support a composition claim, 
but the method of extracting the pure composition from its impure 
surroundings could support a method claim.13 This simple articulation of the 
rule was established as an offshoot of the product of nature doctrine, an 
important judicial rule defining a portion of § 101 subject matter eligibility.14 
The purified preexisting products doctrine does not, however, exclusively 
apply to extractions of products of nature. Instead, it can be applied to any 
 
 9. 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), rev’d in part and aff’d in part, 653 F.3d 1329 
(Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 
S. Ct. 1794 (2012). 
 10. Id. at 183–86. 
 11. See infra Part II.C–D. 
 12. See Cochrane v. Badische Anilin & Soda Fabrik, 111 U.S. 293 (1884); Am. Wood-Paper 
Co. v. Fibre Disintegrating Co., 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 566 (1874). 
 13. See Am. Wood-Paper, 90 U.S. at 593–94. 
 14. See Parasidis, supra note 1, at 326. 
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known previously existing product, be it naturally occurring or man-made.15 
Over the course of time and likely in response to developments in sciences 
such as microbiology and pharmaceuticals, the purified preexisting products 
doctrine began to be applied differently by different courts.16 Much of the 
confusion about the doctrine arose out of the Court’s simple statement thereof. 
The rule statement leaves out crucial metrics for determining what qualifies as 
a mere extraction and what amounts to more than that. For purposes of this 
Note, this important distinction is framed as the difference between a mere 
extraction (unpatentable subject matter) and a new “kind” of composition 
(patentable subject matter). 
This Note contends that the primary reason for confusion in the application 
of the doctrine is the lack of a defining characteristic that distinguishes 
products that are different in “kind” from one another. In view of its origins, 
the purification doctrine is clearly an offshoot of the product of nature doctrine, 
which is a subject matter eligibility issue. This Note presumes the position that 
the statutory elements of patentability ought to be considered separately from 
one another. Assuming this premise and considering the Supreme Court’s 
articulation of the doctrine, the proposed standard for “kinds” of products is a 
discrete issue of subject matter eligibility. Accordingly, so as not to conflate 
subject matter eligibility with the other statutory elements, the standard ought 
to be free from considerations that overlap with statutory utility, novelty, or 
nonobviousness analyses. Instead, in keeping with the fundamental tenet of 
claim drafting, a composition’s “kind” ought to be an exclusively structural 
determination. Ultimately, the relevant structural definition can be determined 
by the chemical boundaries of molecules and formula units, so that chemically 
distinct compositions comprise new materials in “kind” that are therefore 
eligible subject matter. 
I.  CASELAW DEFINING THE PURIFIED PREEXISTING PRODUCTS DOCTRINE 
A. The Statutory Basis for the Purified Preexisting Products Doctrine 
One threshold requirement of patentability is that an inventive conception 
be one that falls within statutorily eligible subject matter.17 Patent examiners 
are instructed to first identify “what, precisely, the applicant has invented and 
is seeking to patent, and how the claims relate to and define that invention.”18 
 
 15. Compare Am. Wood-Paper, 90 U.S. at 577, 596 (applying the doctrine to a pulp made by 
boiling naturally occurring wood in an alkali under pressure), with Cochrane, 111 U.S. at 311 
(applying the doctrine to man-made, artificial alizarine). 
 16. See infra Part I.C–F. 
 17. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 18. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 
2106 (8th ed. Rev. 8, July 2010) [hereinafter MPEP]. 
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It is the claims that “define the property rights provided by a patent, and thus 
require careful scrutiny.”19 Before considering whether an inventive concept is 
patent-eligible subject matter, an examiner must conduct a thorough review of 
the prior art.20 
Section 101 provides that “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and 
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new 
and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor.”21 In Diamond 
v. Chakrabarty, the Supreme Court recognized that Congress intended the 
expansive language of this statute to include “anything under the sun that is 
made by man.”22 According to the Court, the language of § 101, which has 
been carried over from the original Patent Act, authored by Thomas Jefferson 
in 1793, embodied the philosophy that “ingenuity should receive a liberal 
encouragement.”23 The Federal Circuit has likewise adopted a liberal 
interpretation of § 101: 
The use of the expansive term “any” in § 101 represents Congress’s intent not 
to place any restrictions on the subject matter for which a patent may be 
obtained beyond those specifically recited in § 101 and the other parts of Title 
35 . . . . Thus, it is improper to read into § 101 limitations as to the subject 
matter that may be patented where the legislative history does not indicate that 
Congress clearly intended such limitations.24 
The plain language of 35 U.S.C. § 101 creates four categories of patentable 
subject matter: processes, machines, manufactures, and compositions of 
matter.25 According to the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (“MPEP”), 
“[t]he latter three categories define ‘things’ or ‘products’ while the first 
category defines ‘actions.’”26 Section 100(b) of Title 35 provides that “[t]he 
term ‘process’ means process, art or method, and includes a new use of a 
known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material.”27 
Thus, § 101 defines four discrete categories of patent-eligible subject matter. 
Even though courts liberally construe § 101 so as to make it a minimal 
barrier to patentability, it does exclude certain concepts, namely those that are 
not machines, manufactures, compositions of matter, or processes.28 “The 
subject matter courts have found to be outside of, or exceptions to, the four 
 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
 22. 447 U.S. 303, 308–09 (1980). 
 23. Id. at 308. 
 24. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1542 (Fed. Cir. 1994), abrogated on other grounds by In re 
Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 25. 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
 26. MPEP, supra note 18, § 2106. 
 27. 35 U.S.C. § 100(b). 
 28. MPEP, supra note 18, § 2106. 
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statutory categories of invention is limited to abstract ideas, laws of nature and 
natural phenomena.”29 “A principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an 
original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can claim in 
either of them an exclusive right.”30 These conceptions are “part of the 
storehouse of knowledge” and are “free to all men and reserved exclusively to 
none.”31 
Claims that include otherwise excluded subject matter might still be 
patentable if they are a “practical application” of the abstract idea, law of 
nature, or natural phenomenon.32 For many years, the test for whether a claim 
was a “practical application” was the machine-or-transformation test.33 
Recently, in Bilski v. Kappos, the Supreme Court held that the machine-or-
transformation test is not the exclusive test.34 However, even under Bilski, the 
machine-or-transformation test offers insight into patentability,35 and patent 
examiners are still instructed to assess whether a claim is directed to (1) a 
practical application of excluded subject matter by physical transformation, or 
(2) a practical application of excluded subject matter that produces useful, 
concrete, and tangible results.36 
Accordingly, at the very least, one useful consideration for determining 
whether a patent claim that recites excluded subject matter is a “practical 
application” is whether it transforms or reduces an article to a different state or 
thing. The eligibility analysis varies based on the type of claim involved, i.e., 
whether the claimed invention is a method, composition, etcetera. Because the 
common law subject matter exclusions (abstract ideas, laws of nature, products 
of nature, and natural phenomena) are distinct categories, this analysis has 
varied depending upon which exclusion applies. In particular, a lengthy and 
windy jurisprudence has attempted to define products of nature. 
B. Supreme Court Establishment of the Purification Doctrine 
In 1874, the Supreme Court in American Wood-Paper Co. v. Fibre 
Disintegrating Co. considered the validity of a patent held by a paper 
 
 29. Id. 
 30. Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175 (1852). 
 31. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948). 
 32. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185, 187 (1981). A “practical application” of an 
abstract idea, law of nature, or natural phenomenon also can be referred to as a patentable 
process. 
 33. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010) (“Under the Court of Appeals’ 
formulation, an invention is a ‘process’ only if: ‘(1) it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, 
or (2) it transforms a particular article into a different state or thing.’”). 
 34. Id. at 3226. 
 35. Id. at 3227. 
 36. See MPEP, supra note 18, § 2106. 
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manufacturer on a pure form of cellulose pulp.37 In its patent, the plaintiffs 
claimed “a pulp suitable for the manufacture of paper, made from wood or 
other vegetable substances, by boiling the wood or other vegetable substance 
in an alkali under pressure.”38 In a separate patent, the plaintiffs also claimed 
the process by which such a pulp was created.39 When the patent was issued, 
paper manufacturers everywhere used wood- or vegetation-based cellulose 
pulps to make paper.40 The plaintiff’s only argument sustaining the validity of 
the product patent was that the pulp created “by boiling the wood or other 
vegetable substance in an alkali under pressure” was a purer form of cellulose 
than had ever before been used or created.41 
The Court found that the patent over the pure form of paper pulp cellulose 
was invalid because it was a mere extract of a preexisting product.42 Though a 
process for obtaining a purified extract of a preexisting material is patentable 
subject matter, the extract itself may not be.43 For patents over products and 
chemical compounds to be valid, their “kind” must have been “unknown prior 
to their alleged invention.”44 Though not used by the Court, the term “kind” is 
chosen carefully because it is at this point in patentability analysis that issues 
get confused, and it is this precise term that needs definition for clarity to be 
restored. In American Wood-Paper, the product’s “kind” was “a pulp suitable 
for the manufacture of paper, made from wood or other vegetable 
substances.”45 By defining the invention’s “kind” as “a pulp suitable for the 
manufacture of paper,” the Court seemed to focus on both the material 
properties of the product and the useful purpose of the product. In considering 
the utility of the product as relevant to whether it was substantially the same in 
“kind” as a preexisting product, the Court, whether intentionally or in haste, 
began what would become a long history of conflating structure and utility. 
The Court found that, because cellulose pulps were regularly used in the 
manufacture of paper at the time of the invention, a mere extraction of a purer 
form of such a product was not patentable subject matter.46 
In a subsequent case, the Supreme Court affirmed and strengthened its 
general holding in American Wood-Paper. Eleven years after that decision, in 
Cochrane v. Badische Anilin & Soda Fabrik, the Court considered the validity 
 
 37. 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 566, 593–94 (1874). 
 38. Id. at 577. 
 39. Id. at 580. 
 40. See id. at 567. 
 41. Id. at 577, 594. 
 42. See Am. Wood-Paper, 90 U.S. at 596. 
 43. Id. at 593–94. 
 44. Id. at 594. 
 45. Id. 
 46. See id. at 596. 
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of a patent claiming artificial alizarine produced by any method.47 Alizarine is 
a natural product, contained in the root of a certain genus of tree, known to be 
useful as a dye.48 The Court found that artificial alizarine was the same product 
in “kind” as naturally occurring alizarine because both products have the same 
chemical form (C14H8O4).49 The Cochrane holding extended the reach of the 
purified preexisting products doctrine beyond its origin in American Wood-
Paper to man-made products. Furthermore, the Court seemed to show an 
analytical shift from defining two products as the same in “kind” based on their 
structural and utilitarian similarities to defining two products as the same in 
“kind” based on their structural similarities alone.50 Around this time period 
and prior to significant development in micro-sciences, the Commissioner of 
Patents regularly denied patent applications for purified preexisting products.51 
However, the doctrine would only remain wholly intact for a short while 
longer. 
C. Early Circuit Court Erosion of the Purification Doctrine 
Shortly after the turn of the century, the purified preexisting products 
doctrine began to erode in the circuit courts, giving way to policy arguments 
premised on the promotion of scientific progress. In 1910, the Seventh Circuit 
considered Kuehmsted v. Farbenfabriken of Elberfeld Co.52 There, the 
defendant had created an impure form of acetyl salicylic acid before the 
plaintiff had developed a manufacturing process for its pure form, Aspirin, for 
which the plaintiff obtained a patent.53 The court upheld the plaintiff’s patent 
despite the defendant’s argument that the invention was not patentable subject 
matter because it was a mere purified form of a preexisting product.54 The 
court found that, though the plaintiff’s invention was a mere purification of the 
defendant’s product from a structural standpoint, therapeutically, the two 
products had dispositive differences.55 In so holding, the court effectively 
found that the two forms of acetyl salicylic acid were different in “kind” 
 
 47. 111 U.S. 293, 296 (1884). 
 48. Id. at 297. 
 49. Id. at 311. 
 50. This conclusion is based on the analytical process of the Court. Rather than noting that 
the two products served the same purpose, the Court solely highlighted the artificial alizarine’s 
and the madder root alizarine’s chemical identity. See id. at 311–12. 
 51. Linda J. Demaine & Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Reinventing the Double Helix: A Novel and 
Nonobvious Reconceptualization of the Biotechnology Patent, 55 STAN. L. REV. 303, 333 (2002); 
see also Ex parte Latimer, 1889 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 123, 125–27 (holding that a purified pine 
needle fiber was not patentable). 
 52. 179 F. 701 (7th Cir. 1910). 
 53. Id. at 702–03. 
 54. See id. at 705. 
 55. Id. 
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because the two products had markedly different utility. The plaintiff’s form of 
the product could pass through the stomach unaltered to be deconstructed in 
the intestines, where it could provide therapeutic value and minimize adverse 
results.56 On the other hand, the defendant’s product could not pass through the 
stomach without becoming unbounded, which proved to be injurious to many 
patients in a therapeutic setting.57 
One year later, Judge Learned Hand, while sitting as judge for the Circuit 
Court of the Southern District of New York, issued an opinion adopting the 
Seventh Circuit’s emphasis on utility as the dispositive factor in determining a 
product’s “kind.”58 In Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., the validity of a 
patent on a purified form of adrenaline was challenged because it was said to 
be no more than a purification of preexisting adrenaline products.59 Judge 
Hand upheld the validity of the patent on the new, purified product on the basis 
of its increased therapeutic value,60 but he also pointed towards the structural 
differences between the purified adrenaline and the preexisting adrenaline.61 In 
what appears to be a total shift from the doctrine of American Wood-Paper and 
Cochrane, Judge Hand found that the structural distinction between the newer 
form of purified adrenaline and the older impure form was sufficient to 
validate the newer form’s patent.62 
D. Early Strong Application of the Purification Doctrine 
In 1928, the Third Circuit in General Electric Co. v. De Forest Radio Co. 
considered an infringement claim against a patent on pure tungsten.63 As a 
naturally occurring material, tungsten always exists in oxide form (WO3).64 In 
this form it is highly brittle and of little value in electrical applications, but, in 
its pure form, tungsten becomes highly ductile and particularly valuable when 
used as wire in lighting systems.65 Despite the fact that tungsten oxide and pure 
tungsten are two different materials and that only tungsten oxide exists in 
nature, the court found that exposing the naturally occurring tungsten oxide to 
heat treatment to create tungsten in pure form amounted to a mere discovery of 
 
 56. Id. at 704. 
 57. Kuehmsted, 179 F. at 704. 
 58. Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff’d in part 
and rev’d in part, 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912). 
 59. See id. at 97, 103. 
 60. Id. at 103. 
 61. Id. at 98. 
 62. Id. 
 63. 28 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1928). The relevant claim at issue read as follows: “Substantially 
pure tungsten having ductility and high tensile strength.” Id. at 643. 
 64. Id. at 642. 
 65. Id. 
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pure tungsten.66 Accordingly, the court found that tungsten was a product of 
nature and not patentable subject matter.67 
Some commentators consider General Electric to follow from the 
American Wood-Paper and Cochrane progeny.68 If that is the case, it 
represents a high-water mark for an application of the purified preexisting 
products doctrine focusing on the structural similarity of two products as 
dispositive of their sameness in “kind.” However, since tungsten and tungsten 
oxide are actually two distinct materials with two distinct chemical 
structures,69 pure tungsten is not really a purification of tungsten oxide. 
Instead, General Electric is better read as a strong application of the rule that 
products of nature are not patentable subject matter. The court essentially held 
that tungsten exists in nature, and, prior to this method of heat treatment, no 
one knew how to find it. The processes used in bringing out the pure tungsten 
are akin to a vast exploratory expedition into remote, largely inaccessible 
recesses of the earth which reveals new (in the sense of previously 
undiscovered) materials with rich utility.70 
In the mid-to-late 1930s, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals 
(“C.C.P.A.”) issued holdings on a pair of cases that showed its continued 
support for the purified preexisting products doctrine. In In re Ridgway, the 
court considered an appeal from a patent examiner’s rejection of a patent 
application for a pure form of alpha alumina.71 Mirroring the language in 
American Wood-Paper and Cochrane, the court found that while the applicants 
“might be entitled to a patent on a method of purifying alpha alumina, they 
would not be entitled to a patent on the article alpha alumina, a natural product, 
merely because of the degree of purity of the article.”72 The court upheld the 
patent examiner’s rationale that the rejection was “not necessarily based upon 
the fact that the applicants sought to get a patent on pure alpha alumina, but 
that they sought to get a patent on a nearly pure alpha alumina.”73 The court 
did not include in its analysis any discussion of the utility of the purer form of 
alpha alumina and focused on the structural similarity between the preexisting 
form and the form claimed in the patent application. However, the court 
seemed to suggest that if an altogether pure form of alpha alumina could be 
created, the structural differences would be significant enough to make that 
form of the product different in “kind” from preexisting forms of the product. 
 
 66. See id. at 643. 
 67. Id. 
 68. See, e.g., Demaine & Fellmeth, supra note 51, at 339. 
 69. After all, no one would argue that O2 (oxygen) is a mere purification of H2O (water). 
 70. The C.C.P.A. also considered a similar case rejecting product claims over ductile 
uranium as unpatentable subject matter. See In re Marden, 47 F.2d 957 (C.C.P.A. 1931). 
 71. 76 F.2d 602, 602 (C.C.P.A. 1935). 
 72. Id. at 603. 
 73. Id. 
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A few years later, the same court cemented this analysis as a rigid 
exception to the purified preexisting products doctrine in the case of In re 
Merz.74 Considering the patentability of purified ultramarine, a preexisting 
material used as a blue pigment,75 the C.C.P.A. found that “while appellant 
may be entitled to a patent on a method for purifying an ultramarine either 
artificial or natural, he is not entitled to a patent on the article which after being 
produced has a greater degree of purity than the product produced by former 
methods.”76 However, the court also noted that this general rule has an 
exception: “The exception is that if the process produces an article of such 
purity that it differs not only in degree but in kind it may be patentable.”77 
Building on the implication present in Ridgway that a totally pure version of a 
preexisting product may sustain a patent, the exception further focused the 
relevant “kind” on structural similarity, distancing the C.C.P.A. from the utility 
focus of the Seventh Circuit and Judge Hand. 
E. Seventh Circuit’s Strict Utility-Based Purification Doctrine 
In 1939, the Seventh Circuit considered Dennis v. Pitner, where an alleged 
infringer of a patent over an insecticide challenged the validity of the patent 
based on the product of nature doctrine.78 The inventor of the insecticide was 
really more of a discoverer of the product, in that the product itself was a mere 
extraction from the root of the South American cube plant.79 However, the 
court did not shy away from the characterization of the product as a discovery 
and its inventor as a discoverer.80 Instead, the Seventh Circuit embraced the 
notion that the patentee had discovered a natural product that could be of great 
benefit to mankind.81 According to the court, the “discovery of a natural 
phenomenon, or of a quality or attribute of a well-known article, which 
discovery is of value to mankind, may be entitled to patent protection.”82 The 
court found the distinction between the discovery of previously unknown 
utility of a known product and the discovery of the utility of a novel 
combination of two known products that creates one new product to be 
untenable and irrelevant to patentability.83 Instead, it focused on the language 
of the patent statute and the intentions of its drafters that its protections be 
 
 74. 97 F.2d 599 (C.C.P.A. 1938). 
 75. Id. at 600. 
 76. Id. at 601. 
 77. Id. (emphasis added). 
 78. 106 F.2d 142, 142–43 (7th Cir. 1939). 
 79. Id. at 143. 
 80. See id. at 144–46. 
 81. Id. at 146. 
 82. Id. at 144. 
 83. See Dennis, 106 F.2d at 144. 
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comprehensive.84 The court concluded that “discovery in the field of science of 
a new quality or phenomenon of an old product may be . . . the proper subject 
of a patent.”85 
Dennis represented the high-water mark for a utility-focused analysis of 
the purified preexisting products doctrine. The court seemed to ignore all 
precedent in its interpretation of the doctrine. Nowhere in its analysis did the 
court even consider the structural similarity between the naturally occurring 
cube root and the insecticide. If applied as the law of the purified preexisting 
products doctrine, Dennis would stand for the proposition that an extraction of 
a preexisting product is different in “kind” from the preexisting product so 
long as the extraction contains some useful benefit to mankind not inherent in 
the preexisting product. 
F. The Patent Act of 1952 and Its Effect on the Purified Preexisting Products 
Doctrine 
In 1952, Congress passed a bill into law that overhauled the patent system. 
For purposes of patentability, §§ 101 and 102 of the Patent Act of 1952 
substantially restated what had been the law since 1870.86 Section 103 of the 
1952 Act, however, established a new lexicon for the requirement of invention. 
Section 103 provides that an application is unpatentable when “the differences 
between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that 
the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the 
invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said 
subject matter pertains.”87 Thus the term “nonobvious” came to define or 
replace the older statutory term “invention.” Rather than resolving the brewing 
circuit split in the purified preexisting products doctrine, the new statutory 
language created an opportunity for further dilution and confusion. 
In the seminal case of Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp., the 
Fourth Circuit considered an appeal from a district court decision invalidating 
a patent on vitamin B-12 extracted from fermentation materials.88 The product 
claims in the patent were narrowly tailored to cover only the vitamins extracted 
from the specified fermentates.89 The Fourth Circuit sought to undermine the 
product of nature doctrine, noting “[t]here is nothing in the language of the Act 
 
 84. Id. at 145–46. 
 85. Id. at 146. 
 86. Compare 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–102 (1952), with 35 U.S.C. §§ 31–32 (1926). See also Eric 
Golas Salbert, Duck, Duck, Bilski: Searching for a Law-Progress Equipoise, 3 J. BUS. 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 339, 345 (2010) (“[A]lthough the current Patent Act of 1952 has been 
considered the second substantial revision, the provisions concerning patent-eligible subject 
matter appear to have undergone only minor changes.” (footnote omitted)). 
 87. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006). 
 88. 253 F.2d 156, 157 (4th Cir. 1958). 
 89. Id. at 160. 
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which precludes the issuance of a patent upon a ‘product of nature’ when it is a 
‘new and useful composition of matter’ and there is compliance with the 
specified conditions for patentability.”90 According to the court, since 
everything is really derived from a product of nature, no original thought 
should be excluded from patentability for that reason alone.91 Instead, the court 
seemed to find that, on the basis of its omission in the new statutory language, 
the product of nature doctrine amounted to illusory fluff, devoid of any 
meaning or purpose. Any application of the product of nature doctrine in the 
past was really only a misnomer for one of the explicit statutory terms.92 
However, the court did acknowledge the existence of the purified 
preexisting products jurisprudence, recognizing two ways in which patented 
compositions are not “new and useful compositions of matter” within the 
meaning of § 101 of the Act: 
(1) [T]hat a patent may not be granted upon an old product though it be 
derived from a new source by a new and patentable process, and (2) that every 
step in the purification of a product is not a patentable advance, except, 
perhaps, as to the process, if the new product differs from the old “merely in 
degree, and not in kind.”93 
The court considered the doctrine as it was articulated in American Wood-
Paper, Cochrane, Ridgway, and Merz, agreeing with the holding of each.94 
Despite its knowledge and acceptance of the structural interpretation of the 
doctrine, the court, citing Kuehmsted, concluded that just because “a new and 
useful product is the result of processes of extraction, concentration and 
purification of natural materials does not defeat its patentability.”95 
Ultimately, the court was persuaded by Kuehmsted’s utility distinction. 
However, rather than focus entirely on the therapeutic value of the extracted 
vitamin B-12, the court distinguished the patented product as a new “kind” of 
product on two utility-based grounds: “therapeutic and commercial worth.”96 
According to the court, the inventor took the natural fermentates “from 
complete uselessness to great and perfected utility.”97 In its holding, the Fourth 
Circuit joined the Seventh Circuit and Judge Hand in a utility-based approach 
to distinguishing new products from the prior art, and further broadened the 
definition of utility from mere therapeutic value to include commercial value. 
 
 90. Id. at 161. 
 91. See id. at 161–62. 
 92. See id. at 162 (“To the extent that the ‘product of nature’ defense has validity, as urged 
here, it is a contention that the patented compositions are not ‘new and useful compositions of 
matter’ within the meaning of § 101 of the Act.”). 
 93. Merck, 253 F.2d at 162. 
 94. See id. at 162–63. 
 95. Id. at 163. 
 96. Id. at 164. 
 97. Id. 
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In the 1970 case In re Bergstrom,98 the C.C.P.A. relented and adopted a lax 
structural-based approach to purified products with the same effect, but a 
different form, as the utility-based approach used by the Fourth and Seventh 
Circuits. In the case, the C.C.P.A. considered an appeal from a decision of the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) that rejected claims for 
purified forms of prostaglandins as patentable subject matter on the grounds 
that the claims lacked novelty.99 The same prostaglandins claimed in the 
applicants’ patent were present and naturally occurring in “human seminal 
fluid, human prostrate secretions, and secretions of the vesicular gland of 
sheep,”100 but it was only after purification that it became possible “to utilize 
their pharmacodynamic effects without undesirable side effects or 
reactions.”101 
The C.C.P.A. took issue with the Patent Office Board of Appeals’s 
position that a claimed pure material is not and cannot be novel with respect to 
less pure forms of the same material.102 According to the court, “by definition, 
pure materials necessarily differ from less pure or impure materials and, if the 
latter are the only ones existing and available as a standard of reference . . . 
perforce the ‘pure’ materials are ‘new’ with respect to them.”103 Furthermore, 
the court found “whether the claimed pure materials have the same usefulness 
or assortment of properties as the impure materials of the prior art, as the board 
here found, is a question having no bearing on the factual and legal matter 
whether pure materials are new vis-à-vis impure materials within the meaning 
of § 101.”104 In so holding, the C.C.P.A. plainly placed the purified preexisting 
products doctrine within the statutory novelty requirement and expressly 
rejected a utility-based approach to defining a purified product as different in 
“kind” from the less pure form of the product. At the same time, the court 
distanced itself from the doctrine as it was presented in American Wood-Paper 
and Cochrane, finding that a mere extraction from “human seminal fluid, 
human prostrate secretions, and secretions of the vesicular gland of sheep” was 
different in “kind” from its source material. 
In 1991, after the commencement of the human genome project, the first 
cases involving isolated and purified DNA patents were being considered by 
courts. In Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., the defendants, who held 
a patent over a human protein, were being sued for use of that protein by the 
 
 98. 427 F.2d 1394 (C.C.P.A. 1970). 
 99. Id. at 1395. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 1396. “The material obtained was found to lower rabbit blood pressure.” Id. at 
1397. 
 102. See Bergstrom, 427 F.2d at 1401–02. 
 103. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 104. Id. at 1402. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
782 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 57:769 
holder of a patent over the purified and isolated DNA sequence capable of 
producing that same protein.105 The defendants offered as their defense to the 
infringement suit a claim that the plaintiff’s patent over the purified and 
isolated DNA was invalid.106 However, it is not clear from the court’s analysis 
whether American Wood-Paper or Cochrane were invoked by the defendants 
as grounds for the patent’s invalidity. Though the court did recognize that 
neither the plaintiff nor the defendant “invented” the gene or the protein 
produced by the gene,107 it found that the discovery of the isolated and purified 
DNA sequence, previously unknown, sustained a valid patent.108 So, with little 
to no analysis, the Federal Circuit opened the door to a deluge of patent 
applications on isolated and purified DNA sequences, and as a direct result, in 
1997, the USPTO issued a patent on isolated and purified DNA known as 
BRCA1.109 
II.  MYRIAD LITIGATION 
A. Myriad: Procedural Background 
On May 12, 2009, a group of plaintiffs, including physicians, patients, and 
various interested medical organizations, represented by the American Civil 
Liberties Union (“ACLU”), filed a complaint in the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of New York against the USPTO, Myriad 
Genetics (“Myriad”), and the Directors of the University of Utah Research 
Foundation.110 The plaintiffs identified several specific BRCA1 and BRCA2 
patent claims they believed constituted patents on natural human genes in 
violation of the product of nature doctrine.111 Specifically, the plaintiffs 
identified claims 1, 2, 5, and 6 of patent 5,747,282 (“patent ‘282”) and claim 1 
of patent 5,837,492 (“patent ‘492”).112 
Patent ‘282 “relates to methods and materials used to isolate and detect a 
human breast and ovarian cancer predisposing gene (BRCA1).”113 More 
 
 105. 927 F.2d 1200, 1203–04 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 106. Id. at 1204. 
 107. Id. at 1206. 
 108. Id. at 1206, 1219. 
 109. Demaine & Fellmeth, supra note 51, at 358–59. 
 110. Complaint at 1, 30, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 
702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 09 Civ. 4515), rev’d in part and aff’d in part, 653 F.3d 
1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 
132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012) [hereinafter Complaint]. Note the plaintiff also makes First Amendment 
arguments to the effect that patenting a sequence of DNA that is innate in every or some person 
or persons violates such persons’ freedom of speech. Id. at 19. 
 111. Id. at 20–21. 
 112. Id. 
 113. U.S. Patent No. 5,747,282, at [57] (filed June 7, 1995). 
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specifically, the invention relates to germline, somatic, and gene mutations in 
the BRCA1 gene and their use in the diagnosis of predisposition to breast, 
ovarian, and other cancers, as well as relating to various therapies for cancers 
that have a mutation in the BRCA1 gene.114 Claims 1 and 2 relate to the 
isolated DNA coding of the BRCA1 gene’s amino acid and nucleotide 
sequences respectively.115 Claims 5 and 6 are dependent claims that relate back 
to claims 1 and 2 respectively and essentially require a minimum of fifteen 
nucleotides of each amino acid or nucleotide sequence116 because that “number 
of nucleotides is usually about the minimal length required for a successful 
probe that would hybridize specifically with a BRCA1-encoding sequence.”117 
Patent ‘492 “relates to methods and materials used to isolate and detect a 
human breast cancer predisposing gene (BRCA2).”118 Like patent ‘282, patent 
‘492 specifically relates to germline, somatic, and gene mutations in the 
BRCA2 gene and their use in the diagnosis of predisposition to breast, ovarian, 
and other cancers, as well as relating to various therapies for cancers that have 
a mutation in the BRCA2 gene.119 Claim 1 independently claims ownership of 
the invention of “[a]n isolated DNA molecule coding for a BRCA2 
polypeptide.”120 
The plaintiffs also identified several BRCA1 and BRCA2 claims they 
thought failed as claiming nothing more than naturally occurring genetic 
mutations. The plaintiffs alleged that Myriad merely observed variants in 
BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes present in individuals and obtained patents on 
those naturally occurring mutations.121 Specifically, the plaintiffs challenged 
the validity of claim 1 of patent 5,693,473 (“patent ‘473”), claim 7 of patent 
‘282, and claims 6 and 7 of patent ‘492.122 
Issued a few months before patent ‘282, patent ‘473 also deals with 
“methods and materials used to isolate and detect a human breast and ovarian 
 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at col. 153 ll. 55–61. 
 116. Id. at col. 153 ll. 66–67 to col. 154 ll. 55–56. 
 117. Id. at col. 20 ll. 38–40. 
 118. U.S. Patent No. 5,837,492, at [57] (filed Apr. 29, 1996). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at col. 167 ll. 15–17. It is not clear why the plaintiffs did not follow parallel tracks 
when alleging the invalidity of the ‘282 claims relating to natural human genes and the ‘492 
claims relating to natural human genes. Claims 1 and 2 of both the ‘282 patent and the ‘492 
patent correspond to the same essential claims as they relate to BRCA1 and BRCA2 respectively. 
However, the plaintiffs challenged the validity of claims 1 and 2 of ‘282 while challenging only 
the validity of claim 1 of patent ‘492 on the same grounds. Likewise, the plaintiffs challenged 
claims 5 and 6 of patent ‘282 but did not challenge the virtually identical claim 5 of patent ‘492. 
The plaintiffs provide no reason for the patent ‘492 omissions in their complaint. See Complaint, 
supra note 110, at 30. 
 121. Complaint, supra note 110, at 21. 
 122. Id. 
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cancer predisposing gene (BRCA1).”123 However, whereas ‘282 claims 
BRCA1 in its pure, non-mutated form, ‘473 is more limited in scope to specific 
alterations to the natural BRCA1 sequence. Claim 1 of ‘282 is the broadest 
independent claim, relating to all the alterations to the BRCA1 sequence 
described in a series of tables found in the detailed description.124 Narrower 
independent and dependent claims not challenged by the plaintiffs also claim 
subsets of claim 1 that amount to human genes with natural mutations.125 
Claims 7 of patent ‘282 and claims 6 and 7 of patent ‘492 also lay out 
specific genetic mutations to the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes respectively. 
Claim 7 of ‘282 identifies and claims three instances of amino acid variance at 
specific nucleotide positions.126 In claim 6 of ‘492, Myriad set out an 
independent claim to any mutated form of the BRCA2 gene that creates a 
susceptibility to cancer, and the dependent claim 7 narrows the scope of claim 
6 to a particular mutation identified by a mutated nucleotide sequence set out 
in the patent.127 
In support of its summary judgment argument that all of the composition 
claims at issue do, in fact, fall under the § 101 definition of composition of 
matter, Myriad relied on the development of the isolated and purified products 
doctrine.128 Myriad contended that the plaintiffs’ argument depended on a 
complete demolition of all of the caselaw in the isolated and purified products 
doctrine since Parke-Davis and Bergstrom.129 Myriad also made a similar 
argument that the plaintiffs simply ignored the clear imposition of the 
USPTO’s guidelines that affirmed the patentability of genetic inventions.130 
According to Myriad: 
The composition-of-matter claims—covering isolated BRCA1/2 nucleic 
acids—are patent-eligible because they do not exist in pure form in nature. In 
 
 123. U.S. Patent No. 5,693,473, at [57] (filed June 7, 1995). 
 124. See id. at col. 159 ll. 57–62. 
 125. Id. at col. 159 ll. 63–67, col. 160 ll. 57–58, col. 162 ll. 1–16. 
 126. U.S. Patent No. 5,747,282 col. 154 ll. 57–67 (filed June 7, 1995) (“(a) [A] DNA having 
the nucleotide sequence set forth in SEQ ID NO:1 having T at nucleotide position 4056; (b) a 
DNA having the nucleotide sequence set forth in SEQ ID NO:1 having an extra C at nucleotide 
position 5385; (c) a DNA having the nucleotide sequence set forth in SEQ ID NO: 1 having G at 
nucleotide position 5443; and, (d) a DNA having the nucleotide sequence set forth in SEQ ID 
NO:1 having 11 base pairs at nucleotide positions 189–199 deleted.”). 
 127. U.S. Patent No. 5,837,492 col. 167 ll. 30–36 (filed Apr. 29, 1996). 
 128. See Myriad Defendants’ Memorandum of Law (1) in Support of Their Motion for 
Summary Judgment and (2) in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 3, 
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 09 Civ. 4515), rev’d in part and aff’d in part, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 
2011), vacated sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 
(2012) [hereinafter Defendants’ Memorandum of Law]. 
 129. Id. at 3–4. 
 130. Id. at 4. 
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addition, they differ in kind from native (naturally occurring) BRCA1/2 genes. 
Specifically, the claimed isolated nucleic acids have new properties and 
functions not found in the native genes, resulting in “ample practical 
differences” from the native genes.131 
In its brief analysis, it further argued that “isolated DNA molecules are distinct 
from any substance found in the human body—indeed, in all of nature.”132 
This is because “[i]solated DNA acquires new properties not shared by its 
native (naturally occurring) counterpart,” and “[t]hese new properties impart 
isolated DNA molecules with new characteristics and new utilities.”133 These 
isolated DNA molecules can be used in ways that are not possible for native 
DNA; they can be used as a probe “to target and bind to a particular portion of 
DNA” or as primers “to bind to (or ‘hybridize’ with) a DNA target.”134 
B. Myriad: Scientific Background 
Some discussion of the pertinent science of molecular biology is in order. 
For the purposes of this Note, the trial court’s discussion of the subject, which 
is largely consistent with the appellate court’s explanations of genetics, will 
provide the basis for the overview. The court began its discussion with Gregor 
Mendel and his first recognition of the notion of genetic material.135 Though 
Mendel recognized the notion of genetics in the nineteenth century, it was not 
until 1944 that scientists discovered that the carrier for genetic material was 
deoxyribonucleic acid (“DNA”).136 The double-helix structure was identified 
by James Watson and Francis Crick, and Crick later proposed three assertions 
that make up “the central dogma” of genetic science: “(1) information is 
encoded in a segment of DNA, i.e., a gene; (2) transmitted through a molecule 
called RNA; and then (3) utilized to direct the creation of a protein, the 
building block of the body.”137 The court noted that since the work of Watson 
and Crick, “understanding of the DNA contained within our cells has since 
grown at an exponential rate and has included the landmark completion of the 
first full-length sequence of a human genome, containing 25,000 genes, as a 
 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 7. 
 133. Defendants’ Memorandum of Law, supra note 128, at 8. 
 134. Id. 
 135. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (Myriad I), 702 
F. Supp. 2d 181, 192 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), rev’d in part and aff’d in part, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 
2011), vacated sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 
(2012). 
 136. Id. at 192–93. The process by which scientists recognized that DNA was the carrier for 
genetic material involved transferring DNA extracted from one strain of bacteria to another and 
recognizing the attribution of genetic characteristics of the first strain in the second. Id. at 193. 
 137. Id. at 193. 
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result of the work performed by the Human Genome Project from 1990 to 
2003.”138 
The court then turned its discussion away from the development of modern 
genetic science to the current state of the field.139 “DNA is a chemical 
molecule composed of repeating chemical units known as ‘nucleotides,’” 
which are either adenine (“A”), thymine (“T”), cytosine (“C”), or guanine 
(“G”).140 “DNA typically exists as a ‘double helix’ consisting of two 
intertwined strands of DNA that are chemically bound to each other.”141 The 
double helix structure occurs because of “base pairing,” where A on one side 
of the double helix binds to T on the other side of the double helix, and in the 
same manner G on one side of the double helix binds to C on the opposing 
side.142 Each of these base pairs is known as a nucleotide, and the terms 
“genetic sequence,” “nucleotide sequence,” or “DNA sequence” all refer to 
linear arrangements of these nucleotides.143 Noticeably distinguishable, a gene 
is “composed of several, typically contiguous, segments of DNA.”144 Genes 
contain “the information used by the body to produce . . . proteins.”145 They 
are further comprised of both exons, the segments of the DNA sequences 
necessary for the creation of a protein, and introns, segments of DNA not 
required to create a protein.146 “DNA encodes proteins by way of three 
nucleotide combinations, termed ‘codons,’ that correspond to one of twenty 
amino acids that constitute the building blocks of proteins.”147 The human 
body contains roughly 25,000 genes which comprise the human genome,148 
and the series of nucleotide sequences within the human genome and the order 
of the nucleotides within each sequence are entirely naturally occurring.149 
 
 138. Id. 
 139. See id. According to the court, its characterization of the field “represents the standard 
undisputed knowledge of those in the field of molecular biology.” Id. 
 140. Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 193. 
 141. Id. at 193–94 (footnote omitted). A helix is a shape that essentially takes the form of the 
red ribbon on an old-fashioned, white and red barber’s pole. A double helix takes the shape and 
orientation of the corresponding white ribbon of a barber’s pole. 
 142. Id. at 194. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 194. The genetic production of proteins is known as 
encoding. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. Since “there are only twenty different amino acids but 64 possible codons that can be 
derived from combinations of the four DNA nucleotides, most amino acids are encoded by more 
than one DNA codon.” Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
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Molecular biologists refer to the normal sequence of a human gene as the 
gene’s “wild-type.”150 Variations from the “wild-type” genes are called 
mutations, which can take the form of single misplaced nucleotides or 
misplaced gene sequences hundreds of nucleotides long.151 Some of these 
mutations correlate with known effects on the human body in the form of 
particular diseases.152 
DNA “is not typically found floating freely in cells of the body, but is 
packaged into chromosomes.”153 Chromosomes are made up of chromatin, a 
mixture of genomic DNA that is bound to proteins.154 From this chromosomal 
environment, DNA can be extracted, and from the extracted DNA, a particular 
segment of the DNA, the “purified DNA,” can be excised.155 Purified DNA 
and synthesized DNA, the DNA that has been created in a laboratory, can be 
used as a “probe,” “a diagnostic tool that a molecular biologist uses to target 
and bind to a particular segment of DNA, thus allowing the target DNA 
sequence to be detectable using standard laboratory machinery.”156 Likewise, 
DNA that has been purified or synthesized may function as a “primer” “to 
sequence a target DNA, a process used by molecular biologists to determine 
the order of nucleotides in a DNA molecule, or to perform polymerase chain 
reaction (‘PCR’) amplification, a process which utilizes target-DNA specific 
primers to duplicate the quantity of target DNA exponentially.”157 These 
probes or primers bind with corresponding nucleotide sequences in the target 
DNA, if such a nucleotide sequence exists therein.158 Because of these 
phenomena in molecular biology, the purified BRCA sequences derive their 
utility from their ability to bind with the native BRCA sequences should they 
exist within the native DNA.159 
RNA, like DNA, “is composed of a combination of four different 
nucleotides, three of which are the same bases incorporated into DNA.”160 
However, instead of T, RNA comprises uracil (“U”) as a fourth nucleotide.161 
RNA forms the basic messenger material through which the processes of 
“transcription” and “translation” can form the protein that corresponds with the 
 
 150. Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 195. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 196. 
 154. Id. at 195. 
 155. Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 196. 
 156. Id. at 196–97. 
 157. Id. at 197. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 197. 
 161. Id. 
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exons in the DNA.162 During transcription, RNA forms a temporary copy of a 
DNA sequence.163 This temporary copy is called a “pre-messenger RNA” or 
“pre-mRNA”.164 “In a process known as ‘splicing,’ the introns are physically 
cut out of the pre-mRNA by the cell and the remaining RNA segments 
containing the exons are rejoined, or ‘ligated,’ together in consecutive order to 
form the final ‘messenger RNA,’ or ‘mRNA.’”165 During translation, the 
mRNA sequence is used “as a template for the assembly of a protein.”166 
Complementary DNA (“cDNA”) “is typically generated by scientists in a 
laboratory.”167 It is “generated from mRNA during a process known as 
‘reverse transcription,’” and takes the form of the bases corresponding to those 
in the mRNA, which is also the same form as the protein coding sequences 
encoded by the original DNA (without introns).168 cDNAs do occur in nature 
in the form of pseudogenes.169 All cDNA, whether it is synthetically created or 
a naturally occurring pseudogene, has distinct differences from native DNA.170 
Because the cDNA is formed out of RNA that had already gone through the 
transcription process, it lacks the introns present in native DNA and therefore 
does not have to go through RNA splicing to produce proteins.171 Furthermore, 
cDNA may be unable to produce proteins without regulatory sequences and 
 
 162. See id. (“During transcription, a discrete segment of DNA unwinds itself inside the cell 
and the bases of the DNA molecule act as ‘clamps’ that hold the bases of the newly forming RNA 
molecule in place while the chemical bonds of its sugar-phosphate backbone are formed. Each 
nucleotide in the DNA strand corresponds to a nucleotide to be incorporated into the newly 
forming RNA molecule: adenine on the DNA molecule binds to and thereby acts as a clamp for 
RNA nucleotide uracil, thymine for adenine, guanine for cytosine, and cytosine for 
guanine.”(citation omitted)). 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 197–98. “Pre-mRNAs can also undergo a process known as 
‘alternative splicing,’ in which different combinations of exons from the same pre-mRNA 
molecule are ligated together to yield different final mRNA products.” Id. at 198. 
 166. Id. at 198 (“In a process that parallels the transcription of DNA, the mRNA bases, along 
with other proteins in the cell, serve as clamps to hold the corresponding amino acids in place 
while the chemical bonds between the individual amino acids are formed. The three-nucleotide 
codons originally found in DNA and copied into mRNA determine which amino acids are 
incorporated into the protein and the order in which they are incorporated.” (citation omitted)). 
 167. Id. 
 168. See id. (“During reverse transcription, each base of the mRNA serves as a clamp for its 
complementary nucleotide to be incorporated into the new cDNA molecule while the chemical 
bonds between the nucleotides of the cDNA strand are formed. Much like transcription, uracil on 
the mRNA binds to and thereby acts as a clamp for the nucleotide adenine, adenine for thymine, 
guanine for cytosine, and cytosine for guanine. The synthesis of cDNA from very long mRNA 
molecules, such as BRCA1 and BRCA2, often does not result in a cDNA strand that is as long as 
the mRNA chain.” (citations omitted)). 
 169. Id. 
 170. Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 198. 
 171. Id. at 198–99. 
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may have additional nucleotide sequences not present in the corresponding 
native DNA that formed as a result of the additional “‘poly A tail’ sequence 
found in mRNA.”172 Likewise, cDNA is also more stable than mRNA and 
“requires both transcription and translation to produce protein, rather than 
simply translation, as is the case with mRNA.”173 cDNA can be used the same 
way as isolated DNA (as a probe or primer), or cDNA can be used to learn 
more about a protein.174 
C. Myriad I: Southern District of New York Decision 
After considering the opposing sides’ arguments, the trial court described 
the validity of the composition claims issue as “whether or not claims directed 
to isolated DNA containing naturally-occurring sequences fall within the 
products of nature exception to § 101.”175 The court identified several cases 
that it included in its product of nature discussion that have not yet been 
broached in this paper.176 These cases, which include American Fruit Growers, 
Inc. v. Brogdex Co.,177 Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co.,178 and 
Diamond v. Chakrabarty,179 established the product of nature doctrine 
generally.180 Although the court used these cases distinctly from the 
purification cases and thereby established the invalidity of the composition 
claims,181 it is worth briefly discussing the way in which these cases formed 
the structure of the court’s explanation of the product of nature doctrine. 
According to the court, American Fruit Growers stood for the proposition that 
a product fails to satisfy the § 101 subject matter eligibility requirements 
“unless it ‘possesses a new or distinctive form, quality, or property’ compared 
to the naturally-occurring article” from which it is derived.182 To the extent that 
the court discussed American Fruit Growers, Funk Brothers, and Chakrabarty 
as a separate and distinct basis for concluding that the composition claims were 
invalid, they will not be discussed here. Instead, attention will be paid to the 
bulk of the court’s analysis involving the purification doctrine. 
 
 172. Id. at 199. 
 173. Id. 
 174. See id. (“[A] scientist seeking to learn more about a protein of interest may transfer a 
cDNA encoding the protein into a recipient cell that does not normally express that protein. If the 
cDNA is operatively linked to particular ‘promoter’ sequences that initiate transcription from the 
cDNA, the recipient cell will then express the protein of interest.”). 
 175. Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 220. 
 176. See id. at 222–23. 
 177. 283 U.S. 1 (1931). 
 178. 333 U.S. 127 (1948). 
 179. 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
 180. See Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 222–23. 
 181. See id. at 232. 
 182. Id. at 222 (quoting American Fruit Growers, 283 U.S. at 11). 
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In laying out the doctrine, the court looked to American Wood-Paper and 
Cochrane.183 Likewise, the court found that General Electric, In re Marden, 
and Ex Parte Latimer were pertinent.184 In recounting each of these cases, the 
court concluded that earlier courts had all held that the purifications of the 
preexisting products discussed therein were not subject matter eligible under § 
101 because they violated the product of nature doctrine.185 
The court also considered cases proffered by Myriad, including In re 
Bergstrom, which the court dismissed for not having been decided by the 
Supreme Court,186 and In re Kratz.187 According to the court, both of these 
cases “presented issues of novelty and anticipation rather than the question of 
patentable subject matter.”188 It found that the Bergstrom court “in effect 
treated the rejection as if it had been made under § 102, observing in the 
process that ‘[t]he word “new” in § 101 is defined and to be construed in 
accordance with the provisions of § 102.’”189 Likewise, the court found that, 
although the Kratz court discussed whether the composition was a naturally-
occurring compound, “the court treated the appeal as a question of novelty and 
anticipation pursuant to § 102.”190 
However, the court gave stronger consideration and spent more effort in its 
analysis of Myriad’s use of Parke-Davis. According to the district court, the 
“question before the court in Parke-Davis was one of novelty (a modern-day § 
102 question), not of patentable subject matter (the § 101 question before this 
Court).”191 Likewise, the court found that it was “[o]nly after concluding that 
the claimed purified adrenaline was novel over the prior art” that Judge Hand 
“offer[ed], as dicta, the statement to which Myriad cites: ‘[b]ut, even if it were 
merely an extracted product without change, there is no rule that such products 
are not patentable.’”192 The court concluded that “the accuracy of this 
statement at the time was written [sic] is dubious in light of American Wood-
Paper (to which Judge Hand did not cite),” and “it is certainly no longer good 
law in light of subsequent Supreme Court cases.”193 Likewise, “Judge Hand’s 
suggestion that a claimed invention was patentable since it was a ‘new thing 
commercially and therapeutically,’” is at odds with subsequent caselaw 
 
 183. See id. at 223–24. 
 184. See id. at 224. 
 185. See Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 223–24. 
 186. Id. at 224. 
 187. Id. at 226–27. 
 188. Id. at 226. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 227. 
 191. Id. at 225. 
 192. Id. (quoting Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 103 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 
1911), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912)). 
 193. Id. at 226. 
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“establishing that ‘it is improper to consider whether a claimed element or step 
in a process is novel or nonobvious, since such considerations are separate 
requirements’ when evaluating whether a claim is patent-eligible subject 
matter.”194 
Finally, the court considered and dismissed Myriad’s arguments premised 
on Merck. The court found the holding in Merck to be entirely consistent with 
the cases it relied upon in this case.195 Because the purified substance there 
“was more than a ‘mere advance in the degree of purity of a known product,”‘ 
the Southern District concluded that the Merck court must have found that the 
product there was markedly different from any product already in existence.196 
Accordingly, after considering all of these cases in the lineage of the 
purification doctrine, the court concluded that “purification of a product of 
nature, without more, cannot transform it into a patentable subject matter”; 
instead, “the purified product must possess ‘markedly different characteristics’ 
in order to satisfy the requirements of § 101.”197 
It is worth briefly noting some differences between the court’s 
interpretations of the purified preexisting products jurisprudence and the 
discussion of those same cases here. The trial court was cautious to portray 
Parke-Davis as holding on § 102 novelty, quickly dismissing the therapeutic 
and commercial value tests.198 Noting a clear line between § 101 subject matter 
eligibility and § 102 novelty issues, the court was able to easily distinguish 
these cases from Myriad I. However, as discussed earlier, Parke-Davis is really 
best read as standing for the proposition that two products, one preexisting and 
the other a purification of the former, are different in “kind” when having 
substantially different commercial or therapeutic value.199 The rationale behind 
the court’s choice to focus on the delineation between subject matter eligibility 
and novelty as opposed to subject matter eligibility and utility presents itself in 
its analysis of the composition claims in Myriad I. 
At the outset of its application of the purified preexisting products doctrine 
to the composition claims, the court criticized Myriad’s argument that focused 
solely on the structural differences in the native and isolated DNA.200 
Referring to the useful property of DNA as an information carrying 
composition, the court noted that “Myriad’s focus on the chemical nature of 
DNA, however, fails to acknowledge the unique characteristics of DNA that 
 
 194. Id. (quoting Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336, 1343 
(Fed. Cir. 2009), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 3543 (2010)). 
 195. See Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 227. 
 196. See id. 
 197. Id. 
 198. See supra notes 191–94 and accompanying text. 
 199. See supra notes 58–62 and accompanying text. 
 200. Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 228. 
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differentiate it from other chemical compounds.”201 The court found that the 
structural differences between native and isolated DNA were unimportant to 
determining whether the two substances are markedly different; instead, the 
court focused on the “utility associated with DNA in its isolated form” as the 
“defining characteristic.”202 
The court did, however, acknowledge the structural differences between 
Myriad’s composition claims and native DNA, recognizing that native DNA is 
diluted with chromosomal proteins not present in the isolated DNA and that 
inside native DNA is found introns also nonexistent in the isolated form.203 
Likewise, the court conceded the fact that isolated DNA attained certain 
functional differences from native DNA, particularly its utility as a probe or 
primer or sequencing target.204 However, the court found all of these 
differences to be secondary because the purification of native DNA does not 
alter its nucleotide sequence.205 Instead, to the court, the marked element 
distinguishing the two compositions was their utility as information carriers, 
and, since the two compositions carry the same basic chemical information, 
Myriad failed to “establish the existence of differences ‘in kind’ between 
native and isolated DNA that would establish the subject matter patentability 
of what is otherwise a product of nature.”206 
D. Myriad II and Myriad III: Federal Circuit’s Decisions 
Upon review of the district court decision, a split Federal Circuit opinion 
written by Judge Lourie came to a different conclusion.207 Unlike the lower 
court, the Federal Circuit characterized the distinction between a product of 
nature and an invention of patentable subject matter as turning on “a change in 
the claimed composition’s identity compared with what exists in nature.”208 
Discussing the facts of the Myriad litigation in light of this standard, the court 
noted “[i]t is undisputed that Myriad’s claimed isolated DNAs exist in a 
distinctive chemical form—as distinctive chemical molecules—from DNAs in 
the human body.”209 According to the court, “BRCA1 and BRCA2 in their 
isolated state are not the same molecules as DNA as it exists in the body; 
human intervention in cleaving or synthesizing a portion of a native 
 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. at 229. 
 203. See id. at 229–30. 
 204. See id. at 230. 
 205. See Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 231–32. 
 206. Id. at 232. 
 207. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (Myriad II), 653 F.3d 
1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 
132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012). 
 208. Id. at 1351. 
 209. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2013] MYRIAD IN VIEW OF THE PREEXISTING PRODUCTS DOCTRINE 793 
chromosomal DNA imparts on that isolated DNA a distinctive chemical 
identity from that possessed by native DNA.”210 
The court next sought to address the distinct structural identity of isolated 
DNA in purification terms: 
[I]solated DNA is not purified DNA. Purification makes pure what was the 
same material, but was previously impure. Although isolated DNA must be 
removed from its native cellular and chromosomal environment, it has also 
been manipulated chemically so as to produce a molecule that is markedly 
different from that which exists in the body.211 
The court went on to explain that “a covalent bond is the defining boundary 
between one molecule and another,” and the differences in these chemical 
bonds between native and isolated DNA “separate one chemical species from 
another.”212 In analysis that should prove helpful to determining the boundaries 
of the purification doctrine, the court distinguished between chemical 
alteration and physical alteration.213 Accordingly, the court concluded that the 
purification doctrine does not necessarily preclude isolated DNA from being 
patentable subject matter, and distanced itself from the rationale of the district 
court, noting the genes’ “informational content is irrelevant to that fact.”214 In 
so doing, the court, although refusing to adopt the purification jurisprudence as 
its basis, effectively returned to a strong structural approach to the purification 
doctrine. Moreover, the court sought to remove any consideration of utility 
from subject matter eligibility analysis and focused strictly on the structural 
properties of the claimed composition. 
Judge Moore reached the same conclusion but differed slightly from the 
majority in her approach. According to Judge Moore, the chemical difference 
between native and isolated DNA does not alone make the native DNA so 
markedly different to place the isolated DNA within the realm of subject 
matter eligibility.215 Instead, Judge Moore looked to Funk Brothers to support 
the assertion that “an invention which ‘serve[s] the ends nature originally 
provided’ is likely unpatentable subject matter, but an invention that is an 
‘enlargement of the range of . . . utility’ as compared to nature may be 
patentable.”216 Accordingly, Judge Moore engaged in the analytical effort of 
 
 210. Id. at 1352. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Myriad II, 653 F.3d at 1352–53. 
 213. Id. at 1354. 
 214. Id. at 1353. 
 215. Id. at 1359 (Moore, J., concurring). 
 216. Id. at 1359–60 (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 131 
(1948)). 
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ferreting out a “new utility which makes the molecules markedly different 
from nature.”217 
Judge Moore, unlike the district court, found sufficient new utility to place 
the isolated DNA within eligible subject matter, noting the “ability to use 
isolated DNA molecules as the basis for diagnostic genetic testing is clearly an 
‘enlargement of the range of . . . utility’ as compared to nature.”218 However, 
on this point, the concurring opinion distinguished between claims over two 
classes of isolated DNA: the first, short strands used as primers, and the 
second, longer strands not used as primers.219 Because the shorter strands of 
native DNA could easily be used as a primer and the same nucleotide sequence 
in native form could not, Judge Moore found that claims covering those shorter 
strands could easily be reconciled with the utility requirement she had 
articulated earlier.220 “Longer strands of isolated DNA, in particular isolated 
strands which include most or all of the entire gene, are a much closer case.”221 
Actually, Judge Moore was unable to identify any purely utility-based benefits 
of longer strands of isolated DNA sufficient to show an “enlargement of the 
range of . . . utility,” and, instead, she relied on more pragmatic reasons to 
uphold the claims’ validity.222 Judge Moore pointed to the USPTO’s history of 
allowing claims on purified natural products and isolated DNA, and she 
concluded that, as a matter of judicial restraint, the court ought not to overturn 
such precedent and create uncertainty in scientific communities.223 
In the dissenting opinion, Judge Bryson advocated for a subject matter 
eligibility standard that considers both structural differences and differences in 
utility.224 While acknowledging the presence of certain chemical differences 
between native and isolated DNA, Bryson refused to concede that those 
minimal differences are sufficient to make the isolated DNA a materially 
different composition.225 According to Bryson, the “only material change made 
to those genes from their natural state is the change that is necessarily 
incidental to the extraction of the genes from the environment in which they 
are found in nature.”226 Though Bryson recognized that the two forms have 
 
 217. Myriad II, 653 F.3d at 1365 (Moore, J., concurring). 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. at 1364–65. 
 220. Id. at 1365. 
 221. Id. at 1366. 
 222. Myriad II, 653 F.3d at 1366–67 (Moore, J., concurring). 
 223. Id. at 1367. 
 224. See id. at 1378 (Bryson, J., dissenting) (“In sum, the test employed by the Supreme 
Court in Chakrabarty requires us to focus on two things: (1) the similarity in structure between 
what is claimed and what is found in nature and (2) the similarity in utility between what is 
claimed and what is found in nature.”). 
 225. Id. at 1375. 
 226. Id. 
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chemically different structures due to separation of previous covalent bonds, he 
concluded “there is no magic to a chemical bond that requires us to recognize a 
new product when a chemical bond is created or broken.”227 In fact, Judge 
Bryson implied that only a matter of degree distinguishes separating a 
molecule from a larger chemical structure and separating a leaf from a tree.228 
Since the chemical distinction alone does not make the isolated DNA 
subject matter eligible, Judge Bryson then turned his attention to the second 
prong of his proffered test for subject matter eligibility: utility. Like the district 
court, Bryson focused on DNA’s informational properties as the primary point 
of utility.229 According to Bryson, the isolated DNA, when compared to the 
native DNA, “retains the character and function of the product as found in 
nature” and “does not result in the creation of a human invention.”230 
Supporting his utility-focused analysis with cases such as Parke-Davis, the 
judge concluded that “[w]hat is claimed in the BRCA genes is the genetic 
coding material, and that material is the same, structurally and functionally, in 
both the native  gene and the isolated form of the gene.”231 
However, shortly after the Federal Circuit decided Myriad II on subject 
matter eligibility grounds, the Supreme Court issued a ruling that changed the 
analytical framework of 35 U.S.C. § 101, at least with respect to method 
claims.232 In Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 
the Supreme Court found that even though an application of a law of nature to 
a known process may be patentable, “to transform an unpatentable law of 
nature into a patent-eligible application of such a law, one must do more than 
simply state the law of nature while adding the words ‘apply it.’”233 If the 
application of a law of nature merely substitutes a newly discovered law of 
nature into a well-known combination of steps in a process that applies a 
 
 227. Myriad II, 653 F.3d at 1375 (Bryson, J., dissenting). 
 228. See id. at 1377. 
 229. See id. at 1377–78. 
 230. Id. at 1377. 
 231. Id. at 1378. 
 232. In Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., writing for a 
unanimous Court, Justice Breyer found claims directed at a method of assessing a proper drug 
dosage to be ineligible under § 101. 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012). The claims at issue recited 
only: 
(1) an “administering” step—instructing a doctor to administer the drug to his patient—
(2) a “determining” step—telling the doctor to measure the resulting metabolite levels in 
the patient’s blood—and (3) a “wherein” step—describing the metabolite concentrations 
above which there is a likelihood of harmful side-effects and below which it is likely that 
the drug dosage is ineffective, and informing the doctor that metabolite concentrations 
above or below these thresholds “indicate a need” to decrease or increase (respectively) 
the drug dosage. 
Id. at 1290–91. 
 233. Id. at 1293–94. 
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similar or related law of nature, such application is normally unpatentable.234 It 
is important to note that in Prometheus, the Court was concerning itself with 
method claims, which are subject to considerations that are quite distinct from 
composition claims.235 Despite the obvious differences between composition 
claims and method claims, in response to its decision in Prometheus, the 
Supreme Court vacated the Federal Circuit’s decision in Myriad II and 
remanded it for Federal Circuit review in light of Prometheus.236 
In response to the Prometheus decision, the USPTO issued a white paper 
that directed examiners on how to interpret the Supreme Court’s rather open-
ended instruction.237 As a first question, in order to determine the applicability 
of the Prometheus analysis, the USPTO requires its examiners to consider 
whether “the claimed invention [is] directed to a process, defined as an act, or 
a series of acts or steps.”238 Thus, in the USPTO’s estimation, the Supreme 
Court was uniquely concerned with process claims and was interested only in 
bolstering the threshold for whether a process claim is a “practical application” 
of a law of nature. At a fundamental level, this means that, according to the 
USPTO, Prometheus should have no bearing on the composition claims in the 
Myriad litigation. 
On remand to the Federal Circuit, the same three-judge panel heard 
arguments as to the applicability of Prometheus.239 Applying Prometheus to 
the claims at issue, the court found that the method claims were invalid in view 
of the Supreme Court’s decision.240 Ultimately, however, the three judges were 
not swayed by the Supreme Court on the composition claims. Judge Lourie 
found that “[Prometheus] does not control the question of patent-eligibility of 
[composition] claims.”241 Further distancing himself from the Court’s 
 
 234. See id. at 1297–98. 
 235. Accordingly, the Court also was concerned with policy arguments that are applicable to 
laws of nature and less apt with respect to products of nature. “The Court has repeatedly 
emphasized . . . a concern that patent law not inhibit further discovery by improperly tying up the 
future use of laws of nature.” Id. at 1301. This is because the Court recognized that laws of nature 
are “the basic tools of scientific and technological work,” and as such deserve special protection. 
Id. These policies apply with unique force to laws of nature because a monopoly over a law of 
nature can inhibit innovation and scholasticism in ways that tend to be beyond the reach of mere 
products of nature. 
 236. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794, 1794 (2012). 
 237. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, 2012 INTERIM PROCEDURE FOR SUBJECT MATTER 
ELIGIBILITY ANALYSIS OF PROCESS CLAIMS INVOLVING LAWS OF NATURE, available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/exam/2012_interim_guidance.pdf. 
 238. Id. at 2. 
 239. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (Myriad III), 689 
F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012), cert. granted sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad 
Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 694 (2012). 
 240. Id. at 1333. 
 241. Id. at 1325. 
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Prometheus decision, Judge Lourie continued: “While [Prometheus] and 
earlier decisions concerning method claim patentability provide valuable 
insights and illuminate broad, foundational principles, the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Chakrabarty and Funk Brothers set out the primary framework for 
deciding the patent eligibility of compositions of matter, including isolated 
DNA molecules.”242 Since Prometheus did not apply, Judge Lourie was free to 
apply the same rationale that he had in his earlier decision.243 
Judge Moore noted that, following the direction of the Court in 
Prometheus, the question of eligibility of the composition claims could be 
decided on the basis of two principles: “(1) laws of nature/manifestations of 
nature are not patentable; (2) a composition of matter with ‘markedly different 
characteristics’ from that found in nature with the potential for significant 
utility is directed to patentable subject matter.”244 Finding that Prometheus did 
not control the outcome of the case, in a truncated opinion, Judge Moore found 
that the composition claims were eligible subject matter on the same grounds 
as in her vacated opinion.245 She also once again expressed her opinion that, if 
given a blank canvas, she would possibly come to a different conclusion.246 
But in her view, the scientific community’s reliance upon longstanding 
precedent allowing patents on isolated DNA compelled her to exercise judicial 
restraint.247 
Judge Bryson concurred in part and dissented in part. Like the other 
members of the panel, Judge Bryson did not construe Prometheus as deciding 
this case.248 He did however believe that some of the underlying principles 
upon which Prometheus was decided could be applied here.249 “Just as a patent 
involving a law of nature must have an ‘inventive concept’ that does 
‘significantly more than simply describe . . . natural relations,’ a patent 
involving a product of nature should have an inventive concept that involves 
more than merely incidental changes to the naturally occurring product.”250 
Relying on Prometheus for the principle that there ought to be a meaningful 
threshold to subject matter eligibility, Judge Bryson again found that claims 
directed to isolated DNA are not patent-eligible subject matter because they 
fail to recite a useful difference from naturally occurring DNA 
compositions.251 
 
 242. Id. at 1326. 
 243. See id. at 1326–33. 
 244. Myriad III, 689 F.3d at 1340 (Moore, J., concurring). 
 245. See id. at 1339–48. 
 246. Id. at 1343. 
 247. Id. at 1344–45. 
 248. Id. at 1354 (Bryson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 249. Myriad III, 689 F.3d at 1354 (Bryson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 250. Id. at 1355 (citation omitted). 
 251. See id. 
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III.  PROPOSING A BRIGHT-LINE STANDARD FOR THE PURIFICATION DOCTRINE 
Although neither the District Court nor the Federal Circuit was inclined to 
analyze the patentability of the isolated DNA sequences using solely purified 
preexisting products jurisprudence, the doctrine, if properly articulated, could 
provide clear, helpful guidance in this context as well as in other emerging 
micro-science contexts. At this point, it is worth reviewing the status of the 
doctrine prior to the Federal Circuit’s first consideration of the validity of 
patents claiming purified and isolated DNA sequences. 
In American Wood-Paper and Cochrane, the Supreme Court set out the 
rule that a mere extraction of a preexisting product is not patentable if the 
extract does not amount to a new “kind” of product.252 While Cochrane 
seemed to shift the American Wood-Paper definition of “kind” to a purely 
structural one, the Seventh Circuit, later joined by Judge Hand and the Fourth 
Circuit, defined two products as being different in “kind” when they have 
different therapeutic and commercial values.253 In Bergstrom, the C.C.P.A. 
seemed to adopt a more structural approach, but one where only slight 
structural differences are required to show that two products are different in 
kind.254 So, along one axis, discord developed in defining when two products 
are the same in “kind,” with the disagreement centered on the precise 
definitions or factors relevant to a product’s “kind.” However, augmenting the 
confusion with respect to the doctrine, on an entirely separate axis, 
disagreement seems to have developed in regard to the statutory basis for the 
purified preexisting products doctrine. Traditionally, the doctrine was rooted in 
and a natural extension of the product of nature doctrine, but the Fourth Circuit 
expressly denied the existence of such a doctrine, making it an issue of 
novelty.255 Likewise, by focusing so intently on utility as the distinguishing 
characteristic of a product’s “kind,” the Seventh Circuit, whether intentionally 
or by implication, analyzed purified preexisting products under the statutory 
term “utility.”256 This multidimensional conflict within the doctrine has created 
an untenable system that is of little value in providing guidance to courts or 
other patent authorities in determining the eligibility of claims over extractions 
or purifications of known products. 
A. Determining the Statutory Basis for the Purification Doctrine 
Before addressing the ultimate issue of defining the term “kind” for 
purposes of the purified preexisting products doctrine, the statutory basis for 
the doctrine should be determined. Confusion as to which statutory element the 
 
 252. See supra Part I.B. 
 253. See supra notes 52–62, 88–97 and accompanying text. 
 254. See supra notes 98–104 and accompanying text. 
 255. See supra notes 88–92 and accompanying text. 
 256. See supra notes 78–85 and accompanying text. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2013] MYRIAD IN VIEW OF THE PREEXISTING PRODUCTS DOCTRINE 799 
purified preexisting products doctrine applies can reasonably be attributed to 
confusion surrounding the product of nature doctrine generally. Since nothing 
in the statute explicitly requires that each statutory category be considered 
independently, occasionally courts, in response to the natural analytical overlap 
between the categories, blur what should be the bright lines between them. 
Having never appeared in the statutory lexicon, the product of nature doctrine 
is a judicial creation,257 making it all the more susceptible to being analyzed 
outside of its proper context. 
Assuming the premise that each statutory element is separate and distinct, 
the rule for purified preexisting products ought to be analyzed as a discrete 
issue of subject matter eligibility, novelty, nonobviousness, or utility. As 
discussed earlier, courts have lacked consistency with respect to their 
analytical approach to the doctrine, explicitly assigning it to statutory novelty 
and implicitly conflating it with statutory utility.258 This inconsistency has 
predictably led to confusion in the application of the doctrine. To develop an 
approach to purified products that produces consistent, predictable, and fair 
results, the statutory basis for the doctrine must be resolved. 
Ultimately based on the following considerations, the appropriate statutory 
basis is § 101 subject matter eligibility. The source of the purified preexisting 
products doctrine is the product of nature doctrine, and, though it applies to 
purifications of products of nature and man-made preexisting products,259 it is 
best classified as an offshoot thereof. The product of nature doctrine is 
generally understood as a judicial creation to be analyzed as a matter of subject 
matter eligibility.260 It limits the scope of patent-eligible materials by excluding 
those products that exist in nature.261 American Wood-Paper and Cochrane, 
the only Supreme Court discussion of the purification doctrine, simply expand 
the scope of excluded products from precise products of nature to include mere 
extractions of products of nature. Thus, Supreme Court authority is clear on the 
source of the purification doctrine, and, without a fundamental shift in patent 
law, wherein the requirement of subject matter eligibility is done away with, or 
alternatively the destruction of the product of nature doctrine as advocated by 
the Fourth Circuit in Merck,262 the statutory authority for the purified 
preexisting products doctrine should remain the § 101 subject matter eligibility 
requirement. 
 
 257. See Parasidis, supra note 1, at 333–34. 
 258. See supra notes 255–56 and accompanying text. 
 259. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 260. See MPEP, supra note 18, § 2106. 
 261. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980). 
 262. See supra notes 88–92 and accompanying text. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
800 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 57:769 
B. Defining a “Kind” of Composition 
Assuming the premises that the purification doctrine properly resides 
within the § 101 subject matter eligibility statutory requirement and that each 
statutory element should be considered independently, the commercial and 
therapeutic value tests advocated for by the Seventh and Fourth Circuits lead to 
an improper conflation of statutory elements. Whether a composition or other 
patented invention has the proper utility is an issue that ought to be analyzed 
exclusively as a matter of the utility element of patentability. Since the statute 
expressly provides that a patentable invention must have utility,263 considering 
the utility of the extraction or purification of a composition in determining 
whether it is a mere purification results in a conflation of the statutory 
elements. Commercial and therapeutic values are merely nominally different 
expressions of utility, and, since the purification doctrine is analytically 
distinct from the statutory utility analysis, any discussion of utility within the 
purification doctrine is analytically improper. Even though the Supreme Court 
in American Wood-Paper left some ambiguity as to whether a purification is 
different from its source composition in “kind” because of its structural 
differences or functional differences,264 recognition of the statutory source of 
the purification doctrine compels the conclusion that the Court intended the 
doctrine to distinguish between patentable and unpatentable purifications on 
the basis of their structural similarity to their source materials. 
Since the purified preexisting products doctrine, as articulated in American 
Wood-Paper and Cochrane, was established as an offshoot of the product of 
nature doctrine, a component part of § 101 subject matter eligibility and not § 
101 utility,265 it ought to be considered as a distinct requirement from utility. 
This conclusion is also supported by the general principles of claim drafting. 
The USPTO has recognized that inventions should be described in the claims 
structurally rather than functionally and that, particularly in biotechnology 
patent applications, a mere functional description of an invention will not 
support a valid patent.266 The Manual of Patent Examining Procedure 
expressly adopts a requirement that biotechnology claims be described 
structurally.267 In so doing, the USPTO has adopted essentially a structural 
 
 263. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 264. See supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text. 
 265. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
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coupled with its function and there is no described or art-recognized correlation or relationship 
between the structure of the invention and its function. A biomolecule sequence described only by 
a functional characteristic, without any known or disclosed correlation between that function and 
the structure of the sequence, normally is not a sufficient identifying characteristic for written 
description purposes, even when accompanied by a method of obtaining the claimed sequence.”). 
 267. Id. 
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definition for “kinds” of compositions. This USPTO imperative, in 
combination with the statutory basis for the purified preexisting products 
doctrine, strongly supports a categorical definition for “kinds” of compositions 
as determined by said compositions’ structure. 
However, this conclusion still leaves the doctrine no more easily applied 
than subsequent to the Supreme Court’s decision in Cochrane. Some tangible, 
structural standard must be articulated to distinguish between mere 
purifications and new products that are different in “kind” from any preceding 
compositions. To prevent arbitrary application, an appropriate standard should 
be based on readily identifiable physical indicia and should signify a genuinely 
meaningful difference between the new and old compositions. Recall that in 
American Wood-Paper, the Supreme Court considered the distinction between 
a pure mixture and an impure mixture insignificant for the purposes of gauging 
subject matter eligibility.268 By extension then, removing an independent 
substance from a mixture269 and creating a pure form of that substance does not 
create a composition that is different in “kind” from the previously existing 
composition. In both cases, the preexisting compositions contained the claimed 
composition in a discrete chemical form, so as a practical matter there is not a 
meaningful difference between the discrete material as it existed within the 
mixture and as it exists in pure form. 
Moving from weaker to stronger connections between materials, 
intermolecular forces between molecules provide the next logical break point 
worth considering. Generally, intermolecular forces fall into one of six 
categories: dipole-dipole, ion-dipole, dipole-induced dipole, ion-induced 
dipole, London dispersion forces, and hydrogen bonding.270 These forces are 
extremely weak relative to intramolecular forces,271 and the point of their 
bonding marks the separation point between two discrete molecules. The 
connection created thereby is generally insufficient to bond two or more 
portions of the same molecule.272 However, hydrogen bonding is different in 
that regard. Molecules, including molecules of common compositions like 
 
 268. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 269. From a thermochemical perspective, as compared with chemical reactions that result in 
new chemical compounds, mixture and separation causes a near negligible enthalpy change. See 
PETER ATKINS & JULIO DE PAULA, ATKINS’ PHYSICAL CHEMISTRY 51 (8th ed. 2006). Thus, it is 
changes in chemical identity as measured by new or broken chemical bonds that account for the 
enthalpy change of chemical reactions. 
 270. See Todor K. Gounev, Lecture 3 Notes, CHEMISTRY 211/212: GENERAL CHEMISTRY, 
http://g.web.umkc.edu/gounevt/Weblec212Silb/L3(12.3-12.4).pdf (last visited Mar. 14, 2013). 
 271. See THANDI BUTHELEZI ET AL., CHEMISTRY: MATTER AND CHANGE 411 (2008). 
 272. See Jim Clark, Intermolecular Bonding—van der Waals Forces, UNDERSTANDING 
CHEMISTRY, http://www.chemguide.co.uk/atoms/bonding/vdw.html (last updated Sept. 2012). 
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water, are formed by way of hydrogen bonding.273 Intermolecular forces, then, 
provide little categorical guidance because they do not form a bond that holds 
together one or more parts of a discrete composition. 
Finally, consider briefly intramolecular bonding as the relevant break point 
for a new composition in “kind.” Intramolecular forces occur in one of three 
forms: ionic bonding, covalent bonding, and metallic bonding.274 The extent to 
which atoms and ions are bound together into one discrete compound is 
generally controlled by these forces.275 If at any point one of these bonds is 
broken, the derivative pieces are two or more different chemical entities from 
their source material.276 It is this consequence of intramolecular forces that 
make them an appropriate starting point for establishing a categorical 
distinction between materials that are different in “kind.” 
However, the categorical definition cannot rest on the presence or absence 
of ionic, covalent, and metallic bonding alone because, as discussed above, 
hydrogen bonding can form the basis of distinct chemical compounds in the 
same way that these intramolecular forces do.277 Furthermore, unfortunately 
for the sake of the simplicity of the patent system, discrete materials are not 
always defined by molecular boundaries. Materials such as salts and crystals 
are not technically molecules,278 but instead are series of two- or three-
dimensional patterns of chemical structure.279 However, these complexities of 
material science coupled with the most basic of human perception can form a 
workable definition. Generally, whether considering molecules, ions, ionic 
compounds, salts, crystals, or any other material, a minimal chemical form that 
defines the material is ascertainable. That is to say that if a container of a 
discrete chemical compound is processed, the processing mechanisms can chip 
away material until a point is reached where what remains is that very same 
material, but if any more were to be removed, it would result in a new material 
of a different chemical structure. It is that chemical structure that ought to 
define a material’s “kind.”280 
 
 273. See Walt Volland, Intermolecular Forces Dipole-Dipole, London Forces, Hydrogen 
Bonding Versus Covalent Bonds, http://www.800mainstreet.com/08/0008-0012-interforce.html 
(last updated Nov. 3, 2011). 
 274. BUTHELEZI ET AL., supra note 271, at 411. 
 275. Id. 
 276. Atkins distinguishes between two separate forms of discrete chemical entities, covalently 
bonded molecules and ionically bonded formula units. ATKINS & DE PAULA, supra note 269, at 
362. For the purposes of this Note, discrete compositions or discrete chemical substances refer to 
either molecules or formula units. 
 277. See supra note 273 and accompanying text. 
 278. These are what Atkins refers to as formula units. See ATKINS & DE PAULA, supra note 
269, at 960. 
 279. See BUTHELEZI ET AL., supra note 271, at 212–13. 
 280. In terms of Atkins’ definitions, a composition’s “kind” is the chemical structure that 
makes up a discrete molecule or formula unit. See supra note 276. 
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There are, of course, limitations to this categorical definition. In fact, Judge 
Bryson, who wrote the dissenting opinions in Myriad II and III, found that 
assigning value to the presence or absence of chemical bonding was 
arbitrary.281 As shown above, however, the chemical bond that creates and 
maintains distinct chemical structure is anything but arbitrary. It is the very 
thing that defines discrete materials and ought to provide definitively whether 
compositions are different in “kind” from previously existing compositions. 
However, In re Marden found that purification of a natural chemical element 
that only existed in nature outside of its pure elemental form would not sustain 
a composition patent.282 This poses a more problematic hurdle to the effective 
administration of this proposed definition, but ultimately this issue is better 
addressed as an exception to the purification doctrine. As a sub-issue of the 
product of nature doctrine, courts ought to continue to find that fundamental 
elements that exist in nature in non-elemental form are not patentable subject 
matter. Even though the element, in its pure form, is a distinct chemical 
structure from preexisting materials, chemical elements are too foundational to 
all scientific notions of materials and too prevalent throughout nature to be 
considered patentable subject matter. 
CONCLUSION: APPLICATION OF THE PROPOSED BRIGHT-LINE RULE TO MYRIAD 
Accordingly, a mere extraction of a preexisting product that is not different 
from the preexisting product in “kind,” where “kind” is defined as a new 
discrete chemical structure, is not patentable subject matter. This discrete 
chemical structure can be ascertained by chipping away at a material until a 
point is reached where what remains is that very same material, but if any more 
were to be removed, it would result in a new material of a different chemical 
structure. By adopting this definitional approach to the purification doctrine 
and providing an articulable standard for subject matter eligibility, courts could 
help create certainty in the patent system without upsetting the analyses of the 
other three elements of patentability. This is but one step in creating a more 
workable patent system. Ultimately, a standard for each separate element of 
patentability should be clearly defined, creating a system where each statutory 
element has a discrete meaning and distinct purpose in the larger patentability 
system. By adopting such an approach, the courts would create predictability 
and consistency that would promote the progress of science and the useful arts. 
 
 281. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (Myriad III), 689 
F.3d 1303, 1350–51 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Bryson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. 
granted sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 694 (2012). 
 282. See In re Marden, 47 F.2d 958, 959 (C.C.P.A. 1931). On its surface, Marden seems to 
undermine the definition of “kind” previously adopted because a pure elemental form of an atom 
is a discrete chemical entity from the molecule or formula unit from which it came. 
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Applying this standard to the Myriad facts makes quick work of the subject 
matter eligibility issue. Since even the trial court’s decision and Judge 
Bryson’s dissent acknowledged that each of the claimed compositions was for 
a new chemical structure,283 the claims should not fail on subject matter 
eligibility grounds because what is claimed is a composition that is different in 
“kind” from the natural composition from which it is based. Because isolated 
DNA is a distinct material from native DNA, it ought to at least pass the 
threshold question of subject matter eligibility. This is not to conclude on the 
whole issue of patentability, and, to an even greater extent, this conclusion is 
not intended to provide a policy judgment on the efficacy of gene patents. 
Instead, the purpose of this analysis is to draw attention to the confused state of 
patentability by highlighting one judicial creation within one statutory element 
and pointing out the confusion created therefrom. By adopting a more 
categorical approach to the statutory elements and attempting to define the 
judicial creations of each, courts can bring much needed clarity to the patent 




 283. See supra notes 203, 224–28 and accompanying text. 
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